The political temperature in Gilgit‑Baltistan has risen sharply as the region prepares to head to the polls. In recent days, the country’s scenic north has witnessed intense campaigning, with the two principal ruling parties at the centre — the PPP and the PML‑N — seeking to expand their influence. The PPP has promised greater political and economic empowerment for locals, while the PML‑N has focused on infrastructure development and road networks. The speeches of PPP chairperson Bilawal Bhutto‑Zardari suggest that friction between the two parties is building, particularly with the federal budget around the corner, adding another layer of complexity to the contest.

In his pitch to the people of GB, Mr Bhutto‑Zardari has invoked the struggle for haq‑i‑haqimiyat, or the right of self‑rule, questioning why elections in the region are not held alongside those in the rest of the country. He has also stressed haq‑i‑malkiyat, or the right of ownership, asking why GB is administered from Islamabad and why its resources are not under the exclusive control of its people. These rhetorical questions draw upon the spirit of the 18th Amendment, which the PPP considers a hallmark of its legacy. Yet speculation about a possible 28th Amendment has raised concerns that the 18th could be vulnerable, and the PPP appears to be drawing red lines around this issue.

Mr Bhutto‑Zardari’s words raise important questions. GB is officially an autonomous region, not a province. Any move to formally integrate it could complicate Pakistan’s longstanding position on a UN‑backed plebiscite for the entire Kashmir region. This raises the issue of whether the PPP chief’s promises are fully thought through or whether they are aimed at a different audience. His criticism of proposals to have provinces fund programmes such as the Benazir Income Support Programme from their own budgets, and his rejection of the rumoured 28th Amendment unless GB’s rights are protected under it, highlight the tensions between centre and province over fiscal responsibilities.

The PML‑N, meanwhile, has also called for clarity on GB’s constitutional status but has largely kept its focus on infrastructure investments. Unlike the PPP, it has avoided direct criticism of its coalition partner, which may reflect the delicate balance of negotiations around the upcoming budget and proposed legislation. This divergence in approach underscores the different strategies of the two parties: one emphasising political autonomy and rights, the other prioritising development projects and connectivity.

The stakes in GB are higher than they appear. The region’s constitutional status, resource ownership, and political empowerment are intertwined with broader national debates about federalism, fiscal responsibility, and governance reforms. As the elections approach, the rhetoric of empowerment and promises of development will be tested against the realities of constitutional constraints and fiscal pressures. For the people of GB, the hope is that these contests translate into tangible improvements in their lives rather than remain confined to speeches and promises. The unfolding dynamic between the PPP and PML‑N in Gilgit‑Baltistan is not just about local politics; it is a reflection of the larger struggle over the future direction of Pakistan’s governance and federal structure.