The year 2025 will likely be remembered as a moment of reckoning in Pakistan’s long and costly struggle against terrorism. Not because militancy ended, or because violence disappeared, but because the state — for perhaps the first time in years — publicly framed the threat with unusual clarity, candour and institutional confidence.
framing 2025 as a turning point
At a press briefing on January 6, the Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (DG ISPR) described 2025 as a “turning point” in the counterterrorism campaign. The assessment was not rhetorical. It was anchored in data, operational outcomes and, most significantly, a shift in how terrorism is being understood — not merely as a security challenge, but as a product of political, regional and governance failures.
the cost of militancy and shifting narratives
For more than two decades, Pakistan has paid an immense human and economic price for militancy. Tens of thousands of lives have been lost, and entire regions have been destabilised. Yet, the narrative around terrorism has often oscillated between denial, selective outrage and short-term firefighting. What distinguished the 2025 briefing was the explicit acknowledgment that counterterrorism cannot succeed without confronting uncomfortable realities — both beyond Pakistan’s borders and within them.
scale and persistence of operations
One of the most striking aspects of the military’s assessment was its emphasis on scale and consistency. According to official figures, more than 75,000 intelligence-based operations were conducted across the country in 2025 — an average of over 200 per day. These were not sporadic responses to high-profile attacks, but sustained actions aimed at disrupting networks, logistics and financing. The operational intensity signalled a return to a doctrine that prioritises persistence over symbolism.
national clarity as a strategic asset
Equally important was the framing of national clarity as a strategic asset. For years, competing narratives diluted the fight against terrorism. Militant groups were often rebranded, rationalised or selectively condemned. The DG ISPR’s remarks suggested that 2025 marked a departure from this ambiguity, with clearer consensus emerging across state institutions about the nature of the threat and the costs of political hesitation.
internal facilitation and governance gaps
However, the most politically sensitive dimension of the briefing lay in its focus on internal facilitation — particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The assertion that a “politically conducive environment” enabled militant activity was not an incidental comment. It reflected a growing institutional view that counterterrorism failures are not solely the result of external actors or border dynamics, but also of governance gaps, enforcement failures and, at times, political reluctance to confront extremist sympathies.
This is not a new phenomenon. History shows that militancy thrives where the writ of the state is contested or selectively applied. What is new is the willingness to publicly link political environments to security outcomes. The implication is clear: military operations alone cannot compensate for weak civilian resolve, fragmented law enforcement or political narratives that blur the line between dissent and violence.
regional dynamics and afghanistan’s role
The regional dimension further complicates the picture. The military’s renewed emphasis on Afghanistan as a base for militant activity reflects longstanding concerns that intensified after 2021. According to the official narrative, commitments made under international agreements — including preventing the use of Afghan soil for terrorism — have not been fulfilled. The result, Pakistan argues, is a permissive environment for cross-border militancy, compounded by the availability of advanced weaponry left behind after foreign withdrawals.
Yet even here, the 2025 assessment avoided the language of inevitability. Instead, it stressed diplomacy, documentation and international engagement, suggesting a shift from reactive accusations to sustained strategic positioning. This approach recognises that Pakistan’s security concerns must be articulated consistently and backed by evidence if they are to gain traction beyond domestic audiences.
revival of the national action plan
Another notable element of the briefing was the revival of the National Action Plan (NAP). Long criticised for selective implementation, NAP’s reinvigoration was presented as a corrective to years of policy drift. The emphasis on intelligence coordination, financial tracking and institutional accountability suggests an understanding that counterterrorism success depends as much on systems as on soldiers.
durability of gains and political will
Still, declaring a turning point does not guarantee permanence. Pakistan’s history is replete with moments of resolve followed by regression. The durability of the gains described for 2025 will depend on whether political leadership across provinces aligns its actions with declared national priorities, whether law enforcement reforms are sustained, and whether extremist narratives are confronted consistently — even when politically inconvenient.
lessons from 2025
The broader lesson of 2025 is not that terrorism has been defeated, but that the state has begun to speak more honestly about why it persists. Recognising the interplay between militancy, politics and regional instability is an essential first step. Whether that recognition translates into lasting change will determine whether 2025 becomes a genuine turning point — or merely another chapter in a long, unfinished struggle.
Today's E-Paper