Artificial intelligence could become the brain of the next-generation economy, while minerals and metals will form its physical body. Just as software vulnerability is important, hardware deserves equal consideration. Every AI system requires metals and minerals to connect its models with physical infrastructure and transform its programmed intelligence into practical applications. The next generation of humanoid robots will also depend on extracted metals such as copper, silver, cobalt, tin and other chemical alloys.
The Market of Metals: Is It the Hypertension of the AI Revolution?
Data centres are among the biggest consumers of electricity and infrastructure materials. Estimates suggest that around 60–70 metric tonnes of materials may be required per megawatt of data-centre capacity, depending on the technology and infrastructure considered. A standard data centre with a capacity of 20–25 MW, or a high-tech facility approaching 100 MW, therefore represents a substantial demand for construction materials and metals.
The next layer of energy infrastructure is actually more extensive outside the data centre than inside it. Overhead and underground cables, electricity poles, transformers, high-tension (HT) and low-tension (LT) panels, and secondary distribution panels are all essential to meet increasing electricity demand. Consequently, the expansion of AI is not merely a software revolution; it is also a race to secure the minerals and metals required to sustain it.
From the Race of Minds to the Race of Metals: China vs America
China is considerably ahead in the critical-minerals competition. According to figures attributed to the IEA’s 2025–26 reporting, the gap between China and the United States is substantial. The comparison illustrates how mining capacity and, more importantly, refining capabilities determine strategic control over mineral supply chains.
Consider the following figures:
– Rare earths: China accounts for approximately 69% of mining and 90% of refining, while the United States represents around 13% of mining and 1% of refining.
– Lithium: China holds approximately 21% of mining and 75% of refining, compared with 3% mining and 2% refining for the United States.
– Graphite: China accounts for more than 65% of mining and around 90% of refining, while the American share remains below 3%.
– Copper and nickel: China’s position also exceeds 10% in these respective mineral markets.
China follows a straightforward strategic principle: whoever possesses the capacity to extract and process minerals can exercise greater control over their economic value. In China, mining projects can reportedly secure environmental approvals within five or six years, whereas comparable projects in the United States may take more than 20 years. America’s democratic oversight, environmental scrutiny, autonomous institutional structure and extensive paperwork can delay large-scale mining projects. China’s centralised decision-making system, supported by the authority of the Communist Party and the PLA, offers a different model of project execution.
How Can Pakistan Become a Favourite Shop for Global Investors?
Pakistan is rich in mineral resources, including an estimated 185 billion metric tonnes of coal reserves. However, possessing minerals is not the same as possessing the industrial capacity to refine and commercialise them. China can invest in refining facilities, process raw materials and sell higher-value products. The United States could also offer competitive investment agreements, technology and industrial partnerships.
Projects such as Reko Diq remain important opportunities, but political instability, the TTP threat and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) militancy continue to create serious security challenges. Pakistan has assured Chinese engineers of their safety, and coordination between the PLA and Pakistan’s military establishment has remained an important part of bilateral security cooperation. Nevertheless, every attack on foreign engineers creates uncertainty, interrupts operations and delays investment. Without stronger security arrangements, these projects cannot progress at their full potential.
Pakistan is therefore attempting to diversify its strategic partnerships rather than depend exclusively on China. Its engagement with Washington, including the high-profile White House visit and diplomatic lunch, reflects an effort to attract American investment and broaden its economic options. Meanwhile, China is also exploring alternative mineral opportunities in Afghanistan and Iran.
But there is another question that deserves equal attention.
Do the people of Balochistan have an equal place in the mineral economy of their own land?
For centuries, local communities have lived above these mineral resources, yet they often remain outside the central equation of economic development. Opposition leader Mahmood Khan Achakzai has described these resources as the birthright of Balochistan’s children. The constitutional, legal and political question of ownership, provincial rights and equitable distribution cannot be ignored.
Pakistan may possess the minerals that the next global economy desperately needs, but resources alone cannot guarantee prosperity. Security, political stability, transparent agreements, local participation and industrial refining capacity will determine the real value of this opportunity.
Will Pakistan become a strategic supplier in the AI-driven global economy, or will it remain a marketplace where others extract, refine and sell the wealth beneath its soil?

