Mathematicians argue that a system can be tested by examining its symmetrical sides: where conditions share the same origin, a rule applied to one side may produce comparable results on the other. Geopolitical analysts are now testing this principle against the Middle East, where Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and the Saudi leadership—the House of Honour—represent three distinct sides of a wider strategic equation. Washington’s policymakers may seek to apply a common formula, but the question remains whether it can deliver the same outcome across different political realities.
Hezbollah and Lebanon: An Unbalanced Political Equation
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has been tasked with navigating the difficult relationship between Lebanon and Israel, while US envoy Steve Witkoff’s engagement with Russia reflects Washington’s broader diplomatic calculations. These parallel developments suggest that the Trump administration is attempting to secure strategic gains on multiple fronts ahead of the midterm elections.
Rubio’s engagement with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun comes amid concerns surrounding an armed truck carrying weapons, reportedly linked to Hezbollah’s defence training activities. The incident highlights Lebanon’s complicated balance between state authority and an armed organisation operating beyond the government’s complete control. The Lebanese government may hold formal political offices, but Hezbollah retains significant independent influence.
Washington’s reconciliation efforts must therefore address more than the immediate security concerns between Israel and Hezbollah. Lebanon also needs economic recovery, infrastructure development, trade and sustainable opportunities. The United States cannot expect Beirut to accept an arrangement that leaves its economy and national interests at the mercy of Israeli security demands. Iraq offers a warning: political support alone cannot guarantee stability when the underlying security and governance problems remain unresolved.
The Houthis and Yemen: Who Actually Holds Power?
Yemen presents a second test of Washington’s geopolitical formula. The internationally recognised government and the Houthis occupy unequal positions in the country’s political and military landscape. The government retains formal international recognition and public institutions, while the Houthis exercise substantial de facto control over territory and administrative structures.
Allegations concerning the diversion of approximately $600 million in external assistance require independent verification. Nevertheless, Yemen’s wider crisis demonstrates that financial pressure and diplomatic isolation do not automatically dismantle an entrenched political and military structure.
The essential question is whether the Houthis operate entirely through external sponsorship or have developed their own autonomous networks of political authority and control. Treating the recognised government as the sole centre of power risks overlooking the realities on the ground. A policy that strengthens offices without rebuilding the state’s actual capacity is unlikely to produce a lasting settlement.
The House of Honour: Can Saudi Arabia Rely on External Guarantees?
Saudi Arabia faces a different strategic calculation. Its geography, regional exposure and economic ambitions make long-term dependence on external security guarantees a difficult proposition. The proposed Mecca Pact framework and Russia’s engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council reflect efforts to diversify diplomatic options and strengthen regional stability.
Yet neither Russian assurances nor American protection can independently resolve the region’s internal political divisions. If Washington expects Riyadh to normalise relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia must weigh that choice against its security concerns, regional responsibilities and domestic priorities. Normalisation cannot, by itself, guarantee protection against threats associated with the Houthis, Hezbollah or other regional actors.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s stated position that ending the conflict with Iran requires regime change raises an even more consequential question: if Washington and Tel Aviv believe that political transformation can resolve the Iranian challenge, what happens if the strategy instead produces another prolonged confrontation? Iran could become the next arena in which military pressure, political isolation and demands for internal transformation deepen rather than settle the crisis.
The Failure of a Repeated Formula
The central weakness of US policy is the assumption that formal governments, external alliances and military superiority can substitute for genuine political control and public legitimacy. Afghanistan demonstrated the limitations of building institutions that could not sustain themselves independently. Iraq and Yemen offer further warnings, while Lebanon exposes the consequences of competing centres of authority.
The United States and Israel cannot indefinitely monopolise the region’s security calculations while expecting other societies to accept outcomes designed primarily around their strategic interests. Security cannot be imposed permanently through military dominance, nor can democracy be established simply by weakening governments or demanding regime change.
The Middle East needs a lower diplomatic temperature, serious engagement with competing interests and solutions that recognise political realities rather than dismiss them. The mathematical analogy has its limits: countries and movements are not identical variables, and applying the same formula does not guarantee the same result.
Washington must reconsider its assumptions, and Israel must recognise that its long-term security cannot rest on regional coercion alone. Unless diplomacy replaces the pursuit of unilateral dominance with credible political settlements, the region’s equation will remain unresolved—and the cost of another strategic failure will be borne by its people.