Sudan’s Interior Minister visited Pakistan on November 7, meeting Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir, Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi and Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar. The official statements appeared relatively casual, focusing on cybercrime cooperation, police training and institutional development. However, beneath these ordinary diplomatic engagements lies a much larger geopolitical calculation. Has Sudan come to Pakistan merely to seek institutional assistance, or is General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seeking a piece of a much larger cake being baked in the Saudi kitchen, spiced by the UAE, influenced by Iran and served through Pakistan at Egypt’s demand? Let us read between the lines and examine what the mainstream media might be overlooking.
What Actually Happened in Sudan? The RSF vs SAF Conflict
Sudan possesses enormous gold resources, with estimates of its reserves running into thousands of tonnes. In 2025, official gold production reached approximately 70.15 tonnes. Yet the government has struggled to capture the full economic benefit because of illegal extraction, smuggling networks and the absence of state control over several mining territories. The RSF has been accused of benefiting from these networks and exploiting gold revenues to finance its military operations.
There are two major armed forces fighting for political legitimacy and control of the country. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), headed by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, popularly known as Hemedti, controls substantial parts of western Sudan, particularly Darfur, and has established a parallel political administration under the banner of a rival government of peace and unity.
The RSF has repeatedly been accused of receiving financial, logistical and military support from the UAE, allegations that Abu Dhabi strongly denies. On the other side, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, control important territories in northern and eastern Sudan, including Port Sudan, and represent the internationally recognised government. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have maintained closer diplomatic and strategic relations with the SAF.
Both forces are seeking international legitimacy through competing external alliances. Consequently, Sudan’s internal conflict has become a regional power struggle.
What Does Sudan Want From Pakistan, and What Can Pakistan Offer?
Pakistan occupies a significant position in this equation. It maintains close defence relations with Saudi Arabia, strategic connections with the United States and longstanding relations with Egypt. Its diplomatic engagement with Türkiye also provides another potential channel of influence.
Egypt has consistently supported Sudan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unified national institutions. The political position promoted by this regional alignment can be summarised as three principles: one Sudan, no parallel government and ultimately one unified national army. This directly challenges the RSF’s attempt to establish an alternative administration.
If Pakistan secures diplomatic understanding from Saudi Arabia, the United States and Türkiye, Sudan could potentially offer investment opportunities in gold mining and refining, reportedly including arrangements allowing foreign investors up to 100 per cent ownership. But who can guarantee the security of these investments when the RSF’s alleged smuggling networks and competing armed groups continue operating across mineral-rich territories?
Between the Lines: Is There a Warheads Deal?
Reuters reported in January 2026 that Pakistan was negotiating a proposed $1.5 billion defence package for Sudan, reportedly including 10 K-8 light attack aircraft, more than 200 drones and advanced air-defence systems. Saudi Arabia was expected to finance the arrangement. However, Reuters subsequently reported in April that Pakistan suspended the proposed agreement after Riyadh withdrew its financial support.
The larger question is whether defence cooperation could eventually connect Pakistan to Sudan’s Red Sea security arrangements, port access, agricultural investment and food-security opportunities. The proposed agreement was never simply an ordinary commercial transaction; it carried significant regional and military implications.
What Does Saudi Arabia Want From Sudan’s Disaster?
Saudi Arabia initially supported the proposed $1.5 billion arrangement but subsequently stepped back. Riyadh wants influence without getting its hands directly dirty in another African military confrontation. It seeks Red Sea security, wants to counter UAE and Iranian influence, and wants to protect its strategic interests through Pakistan’s diplomatic and defence relationships.
The Saudi leadership also wants to stabilise Sudan, prevent further fragmentation and avoid political developments that could threaten its Vision 2030 ambitions, including NEOM and other Red Sea projects. Pakistan’s military and institutional experience could become a useful component of this strategy.
What Does the UAE Want From the Equation?
The UAE’s interests extend beyond political influence. Sudan’s gold resources, commercial networks and strategic ports represent enormous economic opportunities. Allegations that Abu Dhabi supports the RSF are central to this geopolitical controversy, although the UAE denies providing military assistance.
The reported $6 billion port-related investment interests and competition over Red Sea infrastructure add another economic dimension. The UAE wants to retain its commercial influence, gold supply networks and strategic position across the Horn of Africa, while Saudi Arabia seeks to prevent a rival regional power from dominating the same space.
Conclusion: The Middle East’s Chessboard on Africa’s Neck
Sudan has become an African chessboard where Saudi ambitions, UAE influence, Egyptian security concerns, Iran’s regional calculations and American strategic interests intersect. Pakistan is increasingly becoming part of this equation through diplomatic engagement, military cooperation and institutional assistance.
Every regional power appears to be positioning itself behind diplomatic curtains to counter the influence of another. But should Sudan’s future become another bargaining instrument for external powers?
Peace must be established through a neutral political settlement, not a biased arrangement that simply replaces one external patron with another. Sudan needs a unified national government, humanitarian protection and an accountable military structure. The ultimate victory should belong to the Sudanese people, not to the competing geopolitical interests surrounding their country.