The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz appears to have reached a dangerous stalemate, with both the United States and Iran claiming strategic leverage over the waterway. Even as the volume of oil crossing the strait has reportedly fallen sharply, global prices continue to surge. The closure, whether full or partial, has already disrupted energy markets, Gulf exports and economies far beyond the region. Yet, while global attention remains fixed on the Gulf, another strategic chokepoint is moving closer to becoming a potential flashpoint: the southern Red Sea, where the Bab al-Mandab Strait connects the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. A wider confrontation there could quickly acquire regional and global consequences.
The recent fighting in Yemen raises an important question: who actually controls the territory through which the conflict is being fought? The Houthis retain control over Sana’a and significant roads and territory, meaning that military operations against them cannot be viewed simply as a conventional campaign against an isolated armed group. American surveillance and intelligence-sharing may strengthen Riyadh’s operational position, but they also raise a broader question about the strategic objective Washington ultimately seeks to achieve.
How is Houthi control alarming Riyadh?
The Houthis, who maintain close strategic ties with Iran, have challenged the existing regional balance by seeking influence over strategically important areas of Yemen. Control or influence around Mokha and Perim Island carries significance because these locations sit close to the maritime approaches to Bab al-Mandab. Any actor capable of disrupting shipping at this entrance to the Red Sea possesses leverage over Saudi Arabia, Egypt and international trade.
The Yemeni government’s counteroffensive and efforts to regain territory therefore represent more than a local military contest. The larger question is whether military gains can eventually translate into sustainable political control, particularly over Sana’a and the country’s fragmented institutions.
But the bigger question is no longer Riyadh’s response, but the escalation of war?
The Houthis have previously targeted Saudi territory with missiles and drones, while Riyadh continues to support forces aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognized government and maintains its right to self-defence. Iran, meanwhile, has denied responsibility for recent Houthi attacks. Nevertheless, Tehran’s relationship with the Houthis remains central to regional calculations, particularly if confrontation with Washington intensifies and diplomatic channels fail.
The danger lies in attribution becoming a substitute for diplomacy. If responsibility for every regional attack is automatically assigned to Iran, while other actors reject accountability for actions carried out by their partners or allies, the result will be further escalation rather than deterrence. The central issue should therefore be preventing the conflict from becoming another arena for an indirect US-Iran confrontation.
How is Riyadh preparing against the Houthis?
Against this backdrop, Riyadh’s emerging security relationships with Türkiye and Pakistan could face their first serious strategic test. Any collective defence arrangement involving the three countries will inevitably raise questions about how far each partner is prepared to become involved in a conflict that extends beyond its immediate borders.
For Pakistan, the dilemma is particularly complex. Islamabad has significant internal sectarian sensitivities and cannot afford to allow a regional conflict to generate domestic instability. At the same time, its strategic commitments and relations with Saudi Arabia could create pressure to contribute to regional security. Pakistan’s challenge will therefore be to protect its partnerships without becoming unnecessarily entangled in another open-ended military confrontation.
How does Ankara find its fuel in the fire?
The Horn of Africa is emerging as another potential flashpoint. Israel’s growing interest in Somaliland has strategic significance because the territory lies opposite Yemen and close to the maritime gateway of Bab al-Mandab. Any Israeli intelligence or military presence there could alter the regional balance and provide another dimension to operations against the Houthis.
For Ankara, this development presents a difficult dilemma. Türkiye has strategic interests in Somalia and the wider Red Sea region, and an expanding Israeli presence in Somaliland could increase competition between regional actors. The danger is that the Red Sea gradually becomes divided into rival military spheres, turning geography itself into an instrument of confrontation.
Washington and its regional partners should therefore avoid treating these developments as isolated crises. The Red Sea basin must be approached as one interconnected strategic space. That requires regional dialogue, de-escalation mechanisms and a political pathway for Yemen rather than an exclusively military solution. It also requires caution against transforming Somaliland, Somalia or neighbouring states into competing military outposts. Sudan’s devastating war must likewise be treated as part of the wider regional security equation rather than a secondary crisis.
The weaponization of geography—from the Strait of Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab—demonstrates how vulnerable global trade and supply chains have become. Strategic chokepoints are increasingly being transformed into instruments of geopolitical pressure, allowing regional disputes to produce consequences far beyond their immediate geography.
The emerging triangle of Ankara’s dilemma, Islamabad’s limited options, Riyadh’s security concerns, Israel’s expanding strategic posture and Washington’s uncertain diplomatic engagement creates a potentially dangerous chain reaction. The answer cannot be another cycle of military escalation. What the region needs is a credible mechanism for conflict prevention—one capable of enforcing international law consistently, demanding accountability for violations regardless of the power of the actor involved, and making diplomacy a means of preventing war rather than merely managing its consequences.
The real test is no longer who can control another chokepoint. It is whether the international system can prevent these chokepoints from becoming triggers for a wider war.