By Arslan Ghazi

Since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan’s security environment has changed in significant ways. One of the most pressing concerns has been the continued activity of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has carried out attacks inside Pakistan while operating from Afghan territory. Despite repeated diplomatic engagement between Islamabad and Kabul, the issue has remained unresolved. This persistence raises an important foreign policy question: is the Taliban government unable to act against TTP, or has it chosen not to do so?

This distinction matters. If the problem is incapacity, Pakistan’s expectations from the Taliban would need to be recalibrated. If, however, the Taliban’s approach reflects a deliberate policy choice, then the issue lies in divergent interests rather than weakness. Examining Taliban behavior since 2021 suggests that the latter explanation is more convincing.

From a foreign policy perspective, this issue cannot be understood solely through the lens of militancy or internal security. Foreign policy analysis focuses on how governing authorities make choices in response to external pressures, constraints, and incentives. In this case, the Taliban government’s approach toward TTP directly affects its bilateral relationship with Pakistan, border stability, and regional perceptions of its responsibility as a governing authority. Viewing the issue as a policy choice rather than a security failure shifts the analytical focus from militant violence to decision-making behavior.

Pakistan has consistently raised concerns about the use of Afghan soil by militant groups targeting its territory. Senior Pakistani officials, including Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, have publicly stated on multiple occasions since 2023 that TTP attacks are being planned and launched from across the border. Islamabad’s position has been that the Taliban, as the de facto government in Kabul, bear responsibility for preventing such activities under international norms of state conduct. Yet Taliban responses have remained cautious and non-committal.

Empirical evidence from the United Nations supports Pakistan’s concerns. Reports of the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted to the Security Council between 2022 and 2025 consistently note the continued presence of TTP leadership and fighters in eastern Afghan provinces such as Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktika, and Khost. These reports also assess Taliban claims that no militant groups operate from Afghan territory as lacking credibility. The persistence of these findings across multiple reporting cycles suggests a stable pattern rather than temporary oversight.

The consistency of these UN findings over multiple years is particularly important. Rather than relying on isolated incidents, the Monitoring Team’s assessments reflect sustained observation, cross-verified intelligence, and engagement with regional stakeholders. This continuity strengthens the argument that Taliban behavior toward TTP is stable and patterned, making it difficult to explain the situation as a short-term governance gap or administrative weakness.

At the same time, Taliban officials have articulated a different perspective. Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani has publicly described TTP as an internal issue for Pakistan, emphasizing dialogue and reconciliation rather than coercive measures. Such statements indicate a preference for mediation over enforcement. Indeed, the Taliban facilitated talks between Pakistan and TTP in 2021 and 2022, leading to a temporary ceasefire. However, when the talks collapsed, no sustained effort was made to dismantle TTP networks or restrict their movement.

This approach reflects restraint rather than incapacity. The Taliban have demonstrated their ability to use force against other armed groups when they perceive them as direct threats. Their operations against Islamic State Khorasan Province in Kabul and other urban centers show that they possess coercive capacity when political will exists. The selective application of force therefore points toward a calculated choice in the case of TTP.

Understanding this choice requires examining internal dynamics within the Taliban movement. The Taliban are not a monolithic organization; different leadership circles hold varying priorities. The Kandahar-based leadership, centered around the supreme leader, prioritizes ideological unity and internal cohesion. From this perspective, taking harsh action against an ideologically similar group such as TTP risks internal dissent and loss of religious legitimacy.

Kabul-based officials, responsible for day-to-day governance and foreign relations, tend to view TTP as a diplomatic liability. Continued violence strains relations with Pakistan, complicates border management, and deepens Afghanistan’s regional isolation. These officials appear more inclined toward managing the issue through dialogue and diplomatic engagement rather than confrontation.

The Haqqani network, which holds significant influence within Afghanistan’s security apparatus, has historically maintained close ties with militant groups. Its leadership has consistently emphasized mediation, non-interference, and regional cooperation. This position aligns with Sirajuddin Haqqani’s public statements and helps explain the Taliban’s reluctance to employ force against TTP.

Another factor shaping Taliban behavior is ideological proximity. Both the Afghan Taliban and TTP draw on the Deobandi school of Sunni Islam and advocate governance based on their interpretation of Sharia law. While this does not imply operational coordination, it does create hesitation. Acting decisively against TTP could be framed internally as targeting fellow jihadists, undermining the Taliban’s ideological narrative and religious authority.

Taken together, these factors suggest that the Taliban’s handling of TTP is the product of internal balance management rather than lack of awareness or control. The strategy can be described as one of calculated tolerance: allowing TTP limited space while avoiding actions that could fracture the movement or provoke internal backlash.

For Pakistan, this assessment carries important implications. Policies based solely on the assumption of Taliban weakness are unlikely to succeed. Diplomatic pressure, military signaling, and border management may reduce immediate risks, but they do not address the underlying divergence in interests. Effective engagement requires acknowledging that the Taliban’s priorities differ from Pakistan’s security concerns.

The Taliban-TTP issue therefore cannot be reduced to a question of enforcement alone. It reflects competing priorities, internal constraints, and differing interpretations of responsibility in regional security. For Pakistan, recognizing these dynamics is essential to avoid policy responses based on unrealistic expectations. Durable stability will depend less on pressure and more on aligning incentives in a complex and evolving relationship.