Ahmed Shaheer
Pakistan’s relationship with China has grown significantly through financial assistance, infrastructure development, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). But beyond borrowing Chinese money and building projects with Chinese support, a bigger question deserves attention: should Pakistan also consider borrowing China’s political system?
The question is not entirely unreasonable. China has achieved remarkable economic progress over the past four decades. According to the World Bank, the country lifted nearly 800 million people out of extreme poverty between 1978 and 2020. Its long-term planning, administrative coordination and ability to maintain policy direction are often presented as important factors behind this progress.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has struggled with political instability, changing development priorities and inconsistent policy implementation. Governments frequently introduce new plans, while projects initiated by previous administrations may lose attention or direction. This raises an important debate: could a Chinese-style one-party system provide the political continuity Pakistan needs?
One of the strongest arguments in favor of China’s governance model is its emphasis on long-term planning. Its political system allows the Communist Party of China to maintain a central role in setting national priorities and directing public institutions. This can provide continuity in policy implementation that is difficult to achieve in political environments where governments change frequently.
Another commonly discussed feature is the role of administrative performance. Political scholar Daniel A. Bell, in his work on political meritocracy, examines China’s approach to selecting and promoting public officials. The argument is that administrative competence and performance can play an important role in leadership selection. These features offer useful lessons. Pakistan needs stronger institutions, a professional civil service and development policies that continue beyond a single government’s term. However, it would be misleading to assume that these outcomes are produced simply by having one ruling party.
Pakistan and China have very different political, constitutional and institutional histories. China developed its political system under the leadership of the Communist Party over several decades. Its administrative structures, party institutions and governance practices evolved within that particular context.
Pakistan, on the other hand, is a federal parliamentary republic. Its constitutional framework recognizes political representation, provincial autonomy and citizens’ fundamental rights. Article 17 of the Constitution protects citizens’ right to form or join political parties. The 18th Constitutional Amendment also strengthened provincial autonomy by transferring several responsibilities to provincial governments. Replacing this system with a one-party model would therefore involve far more than an administrative adjustment. It would raise fundamental constitutional and political questions.
Pakistan’s own history also offers a warning. Military governments under Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf concentrated political authority, yet centralized power alone did not establish the kind of consistent institutional development associated with China’s experience. Similarly, Pakistan’s nationalization policies during the 1970s demonstrated that greater state control does not automatically produce effective economic management. The problem, therefore, is not simply the number of political parties or changes in government. It is the weakness of institutions that should ensure continuity, accountability, and effective implementation regardless of who holds power.
China’s model also has limitations that Pakistan cannot ignore. A political system with one dominant ruling party offers fewer opportunities for competitive political change at the national level. Restrictions on political opposition, independent media and public criticism raise serious concerns about accountability and individual freedoms. Even supporters of political meritocracy acknowledge challenges involving political legitimacy, corruption and the concentration of power. A system that can maintain policy continuity may also make it harder to challenge poor decisions or hold powerful institutions accountable.
For Pakistan, adopting such a model could create more problems than it solves. Political stability should not come at the cost of constitutional rights, democratic representation, or provincial autonomy. Instead of copying China’s entire political structure, Pakistan should identify the administrative practices that can work within its own constitutional framework.
For instance, major political parties should agree on a national development charter covering the next 10 to 15 years. It could focus on key priorities such as energy, exports, education and skills development. Governments should be able to improve this framework without abandoning its core objectives whenever political leadership changes. Similarly, civil service promotions and professional development should be linked to measurable performance, relevant training, and institutional results. Civil servants should also receive reasonable job security and fixed tenures to reduce unnecessary political interference.
Major public projects, including CPEC-related initiatives, should be monitored through transparent and independent mechanisms. Progress reports should be presented to Parliament at regular intervals so that delays, cost overruns and implementation failures can be identified. Furthermore, agreements with Chinese companies should create opportunities for local employment, technical training and knowledge transfer. Pakistan should focus not only on completing infrastructure projects but also on developing the domestic skills and industrial capacity needed to sustain them.
China’s development experience deserves serious study, particularly its approach to long-term planning, administrative coordination and institutional capacity. But its achievements cannot be reduced to the existence of a one-party system, nor can that system simply be transferred to a country with a different constitutional and political history.
Pakistan’s challenge is not that it has too many political parties. Its deeper challenge is that governments, institutions, and policies often fail to maintain a consistent direction. The country does not need to borrow China’s political system along with its financial assistance. It needs to build institutions capable of delivering results under any elected government. The real lesson from China is not that Pakistan should abandon democracy, but that development requires planning, discipline, and institutions that work beyond political cycles.