The UN General Assembly address continues to expose the widening gap between political narratives and geopolitical realities. Among the most disconnected narratives was that presented by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who once again attempted to shape the discussion around Israel as a permanently threatened state. His argument follows a familiar pattern: Israel is surrounded by enemies determined to attack it, and therefore its military actions are presented as an extension of its right to self-defence. But the geopolitical position of the Middle East is entering a phase in which military narratives alone can no longer define political reality.
The first principle is simple: military force cannot permanently change political realities, and facts imposed through force cannot automatically shape political narratives. Israel’s military capabilities may be far superior to those of many regional actors, but military superiority does not necessarily translate into the ability to permanently redesign borders, settlements or the political future of the West Bank, where Palestinians continue to assert their right to exist and exercise political rights. The central question is no longer simply who possesses greater military power, but who can construct a sustainable political order after military operations end.
The discussion surrounding the United States has become equally significant. Tucker Carlson, after his meeting with the Israeli ambassador, argued that the conflict involving Iran is not merely about preventing a nuclear capability but about reducing Iran’s strategic strength to a level where it cannot pose a major threat to Israel. He also highlighted the Gulf states’ growing trust deficit: countries that have invested heavily in stability, infrastructure and economic transformation increasingly expect security to protect their investments rather than expose them to another regional confrontation. The continued presence of American forces in the Middle East has also generated debate over financial and strategic costs. When Carlson raised the issue with Donald Trump, his response that ultimately “we are all going to die anyway” was presented humorously, but the underlying policy question remains serious. Continued American military backing for Israel, without a parallel diplomatic strategy, risks becoming a factor that sustains escalation rather than resolving it.
Iran, meanwhile, must also understand the limits of its strategic threshold. Its responses and diplomatic positioning have demonstrated considerable strategic calculation, but rigid decisions can carry significant costs. Iran has warned that if neighbouring states participate in attacks against it, they could become targets as well. Politically, however, this risks reinforcing the narrative promoted by Netanyahu and Trump that Iran is the regional aggressor. Tehran still has diplomatic space through Qatar and Pakistan’s mediation efforts, while Russia has supported the implementation of understandings associated with the Islamabad framework. Iran therefore faces a delicate calculation: any military escalation against neighbouring states could undermine the diplomatic arrangements it has worked to establish and provide Washington and Israel with justification for further countermeasures. The contest has increasingly become a test of strategic nerves, and Tehran cannot afford to blink—but neither can it afford to miscalculate.
What role will the wider Middle East play? The ongoing Oman talks, Qatar’s mediation efforts and the emerging Saudi-led regional security framework all indicate that the Gulf states understand the consequences of another major war. Their preference increasingly appears to be diplomacy, economic stability and regional de-escalation. They may support the Palestinian people and oppose the destruction in Gaza, but they also recognise that confronting Israel through another military escalation could devastate the region’s economic transformation. The Gulf states have invested heavily in economic diversification, including Saudi Arabia‘s Vision 2030, and another regional war threatens business, tourism, investment and long-term development. Their objective is therefore increasingly to remain outside direct military confrontation. Iran must recognise this red line as well. A country already facing economic pressure cannot afford to lose its remaining regional relationships. The changing positions of regional financial institutions and Turkey’s evolving economic calculations further demonstrate how costly diplomatic isolation can become.
China’s position makes the equation even more complicated. If Beijing provides no direct military assistance to Iran while Russia continues to support Tehran diplomatically, the strategic balance becomes harder to predict. China’s cautious position may indicate that it does not want to become directly involved in another Middle Eastern conflict. Silence can sometimes be diplomatic strategy, but explicit assurances about maintaining relations while withholding military support send a different message. The result is a regional contest in which every major power is calculating its economic interests, military exposure and diplomatic leverage.
The emerging Middle East therefore presents a fundamental choice: continued dependence on military deterrence or a transition toward economic integration, diplomacy and strategic autonomy. Military power can destroy infrastructure, alter calculations and create temporary deterrence—but it cannot by itself create lasting political legitimacy. The region’s future may ultimately be determined not by who can fire the most missiles, but by who can build the most sustainable political and economic order after the missiles stop.