The future of global politics is increasingly tied to the resources states possess, the maritime routes they can access, and the alliances they can build. From the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, a struggle over energy security, commercial shipping and regional influence is reshaping diplomatic calculations. Countries are no longer relying solely on traditional partners. Instead, they are pursuing new agreements to protect their interests, sometimes cooperating with states whose regional ambitions directly contradict their own.
The Mediterranean offers a clear example of this changing geopolitical landscape. The maritime agreement between Turkey and Libya, signed on November 27, 2019, established competing claims over jurisdictional waters in the Eastern Mediterranean. The memorandum was signed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Fayez al-Sarraj, then head of Libya’s internationally recognised Government of National Accord.
Turkey maintains that its extensive Mediterranean coastline should not be restricted by the proximity of Greek islands. Greece and Cyprus, however, argue that the agreement disregards their maritime rights, particularly around Crete, Rhodes and Karpathos. The disagreement reflects a wider legal dispute over whether islands should receive full consideration when maritime boundaries are drawn. Turkey is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), while Greece relies on the convention to support its position.
The stakes extend beyond legal arguments. Potential natural gas reserves and proposed energy infrastructure have made the Eastern Mediterranean an increasingly important strategic arena. In August 2020, Greece and Egypt signed their own partial maritime delimitation agreement, creating overlapping claims with the Turkey-Libya arrangement. Greece has also raised concerns about the implications for regional energy connections, including the proposed EastMed gas pipeline linking Israel, Cyprus and Greece.
The dispute gained renewed attention on October 20, 2026, when Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives reportedly approved the 2019 memorandum, reversing its previous opposition. Turkey welcomed the development, while the European Union, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates maintained that the agreement infringed upon the rights of third states. Even if two countries agree on a maritime boundary, their arrangement cannot automatically settle the legal rights of countries that have not consented to it.
The Red Sea presents a different but equally complicated picture. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have faced growing difficulties in reconciling their regional interests. According to The Guardian in October 2026, the two countries were moving towards renewed coordination, with the UAE reportedly prepared to resume funding for southern Yemeni forces, including the Giants Brigades, while Saudi Arabia would provide air cover. The reported arrangement reflects their shared concern about Houthi advances and the security of important maritime routes.
However, another report published by Drop Site News on October 28 alleged that UAE-aligned actors had shared intelligence with Houthi authorities. These claims remain unverified and have been denied by the parties concerned. They illustrate the complexity of Yemen’s conflict, where local rivalries, competing regional ambitions and international interests frequently overlap.
Russia’s reported contacts with the Houthis add another dimension. In 2024, US Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking acknowledged dialogue between Moscow and the Houthis concerning possible cooperation, including weapons transfers. Subsequent media reports alleged Russian intelligence assistance connected to Red Sea shipping attacks. Other reports suggested that Moscow reconsidered possible missile transfers following diplomatic pressure from Washington and Riyadh.
More recent allegations concerning Russian missile supplies and exchanges involving Yemeni fighters remain unconfirmed. Nevertheless, the reported contacts raise questions about whether Moscow could seek greater leverage over Red Sea shipping security while advancing its broader strategic interests.
From the waters south of Crete to Bab al-Mandeb, the underlying pattern is increasingly apparent. Turkey and Libya are advancing maritime claims, Greece and Egypt are defending competing interests, and Gulf powers are attempting to rebuild cooperation against the Houthis despite their differences. Russia, meanwhile, has its own reasons to seek influence over regional security arrangements.
These developments reveal the limitations of diplomacy based exclusively on competing bargains. Bilateral agreements may strengthen individual positions, but they cannot guarantee lasting stability when neighbouring states believe their sovereign rights are being ignored.
The challenge for Europe, Russia and Middle Eastern powers is to prevent maritime competition from becoming another source of prolonged confrontation. Ultimately, secure shipping routes, reliable energy supplies and regional stability will depend not merely on strategic leverage, but on credible diplomacy, respect for international law and arrangements that recognise the legitimate interests of all parties.